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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CORPORATION NINE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

HAY L. TAYLOR and
NEYA 'V. TAYLOR, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents,
RAYL. TAYLOR and
NEYA ,V. TAYLOR, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No.
12983

vs.

CORPORATION NINE, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant-AppeUant.

Plaintiff-Appellant Corporation Nine's Brief
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks specific performance of
the terms of a contract of sale and for interpretation of
Yarious aspects of the contract and/ or for damages for

1

non-performance, together with costs and attorney's
fees and Dt:fendants-Respondents seek to lrnYe title
quieted to the property described in the contract of sale
together with interest, costs and attorney's fees, with
the cases being consolidated for trial.
)

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
J udgrnent finding the contract price to be as stated
in the contract, fixing the unpaid principal and method
of computation of interest, finding Plaintiff-Appellant
in default, dismissing John "r. New from the lawsuits,
quieting title with respect to the property under the
contract remaining unconveyed, awarding no damages,
and awarding Defendants-Respondents attorney's fees
and costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks an order vacating the
judgment of forfeiture and termination and award of
attorney's fees, for an order reinstating the contract and
an order ordering the Defendants-Respondents to make
the requested conveyance for money tendered and/ or in
the alternative damages for improper termination of the
contract, together with an award of costs and attorney's
fees.

STATE1\1:ENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendants made and entered into a
written contract of purchase dated January 24, 1968

2

wherein the Defendants were referred to as the Sellers,
an<l the Plaintiff was referred to as lluyer, for the sale
and purchase of approximately 50 acres of raw land
located East of \Vasatch Boulevard at approximately
10th South Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
a copy of which is attached to the Complaint on file
herein, said contract being executed on or about J anuary 30, 1968. (R. 5-11 and Ex. P-1)
That approximately the same date of the execution
of the contract of purchase for the 50 acres, the Defendants gave to the Plaintiff, pursuant to a letter dated
J auuary 30, 1968, the First Right of Refusal to purchase an additional 44.58 acres immediately North and
adjacent to the property, the subject of said contract.
That on or about February ti, 1969 the Plaintiff
and Defendants entered into a Letter of Instructions to
Security Title Company of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, wherein certain terms of the
contract of purchase were altered and modified as set
forth in said Letter of Instructions attached to the Complaint of the Plaintiff herein. (R. 12-14 and Ex. P-5)
That by the terms of the contract, the sale and purchase price of the 50 acres was a total of $240,000.00, or
$4,800.00 per acre. The Plaintiff was to pay the sum of
$20,000.00 as a down payment and was to receive the
release and conveyance of six ( 6) acres of land by 'Varranty Deed in exchange for the down payment. The contract further provided that Plaintiff would pay the sum
of $25,000.00 per year commencing with March l, 1969,
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together with interest at the rate of 4% per annum after
March 1, 1969. Plaintiff, for each $:.:?5,000.00 paid 011
the principal, was to receive fee title by '"' arranty Deed
to five ( 5) acres of land contiguous to the previous land
released, with the full balance of the unconveyed acreage
described in said contract being released at the end of
the contract. ( R. 6-7; Ex. P-5) This release provision of
$5,000.00 per acre allowed the Defendants to stay ahead
of the Plaintiffs by the sum of $200.00 per acre.
Although the Plaintiff was to receive six ( 6) acres
at the time of the down payment, it was determined, and
verbally agreed upon, that the Plaintiff would receive
6.567 acres. The extra acreage being needed to round
out some lots. It was verbally agreed that Plaintiff
would give Defendants a Promissory Note for the sum
of $12,835.00 payable in three years with no interest and
~aid note was properly executed and has been paid. This
agreement at this time was a verbal modification of the
contract and with execution of the note made the acreage release not 6 acres for $20,000.00, but 6.567 acres
for $32,835.00 at the time of the execution of the contract.
The Plaintiff, in the forepart of 1969, was approached to hold the Utah Home Show for 1969 on a
portion of the property, the subject of this contract, and
the Defendants were so advised and consented to same.
This new development required the release of additional
acreage and a change on the payments which were
handled through Security Title Company, pursuant to
the Letter of Instructions attached to Plaintiff's Com-

4

plaint. ( R. 1:2-14 and Ex. P-5) It was also determined,
that because of a Salt Lake County requirement for
drainage, an additional 1.180 acres would be needed to
handle said drainage for the subdivision. This 1.180
acres being outside of the contract description, but on
the 44.58 acres owned by the Defendants adjacent to
the contract description and for which the Plaintiff had
First Right of Refusal. (Def. Dep. Ex. D-6) The Defendants retained a drainage easement on said 1.18
acres. The parties discussed the handling of the 1.18
acres as to whether it should be considered part of the
contract or as a separate matter and it did not seem to
matter to either of them to a great extent. Plaintiff later
verbally asked that the 1.18 acres be considered part of
the 50 acres purchased and the Defendants verbally
agreed. (Def. Dep. P. 31, 45; Pl. Dep. P. 38-39 and 65)
On or about February 6, 1969 some 14.248 acres
were conveyed with payments being made of $30,900.00
on February 17, 1969, $22,250.00 on October 9, 1969
and $18,090.00 on January 7, 1970, thereby making a
total payment on the contract to January 7, 1970 of
$104<,075.00 with a total of 20.815 acres having been
com·eyed to the Plaintiff to this date. The above payments in effect prepaid the contract and no payments
were made on the principal of the contract for 1970,
except the $18,090.00 paid on January 7, 1970. No other
principal payments were made for the reason that the
annual payments were prepaid, the parties verbally
agreed that none need be made, and for the further reason that the Defendant did not want any more money.
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tached to the Complaint of the Plaintiff (R. 15-16) an<l
a copy of the Taylor-Young contract attached to the
deposition of Ray L. Taylor on file herein and which
was published at the hearing in the lower court. (Def.
Dep. Ex 2)
Notwithstanding the sale to Young, the Defendants notified the Plaintiff in January, 1971 that they
had a sale for a portion of the 44.58 acres which the
Plaintiff had First Right of Refusal on, and upon investigation it was found that this sale was not a valid sale
and nothing arose from this alleged transaction.
In February, 1971 Defendants requested improper
interest and principal on the unpaid balance of the contract and interest on the interest free note balance at
which time Plaintiff seriously started to check interest,
etc. pertaining to said request and found them to be
wrong. On March 24, 1971, and within the grace period
set out in the contract, the Plaintiff relying on Defendants' past representations and in accordance with its
understanding and in reliance on the Defendants' representations, forwarded its check No. 2156 in the sum of
$9,197.00 to cover the March 1, 1971 interest and principal payments. (Ex. P-15) Plaintiff sent a legal description of 0.752 acres prepared by Bush & Gudgell,
Inc. which represented the balance of the ground that
Plaintiff was entitled, per the contract, upon the payment mentioned above. This description was contiguous
to the property previously released and transferred and
was needed by the Plaintiff to proceed with the develop-
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ment of the cluster type homes as the propery had been
rezoned for such purposes. The above payment was calculated as follows:
Acres
Conveyed

Date

Payments Received

~/1/68

6 ..567

:2/19/68

$ 20,000.00 Cash
12,835.00 Promissory

~1u/HD

U.:248

:2117169

Date

------------

------------

IOI

9/69

II 7170

Note

30,900.00 Cash
22,250.00 Cash
18,090.00 Cash

Totals
:20.815 acres released $104,075.00 Paid
Contract
50.000 acres
240,000.00 (per
Total
contract)
Bal. :L!J.185 acres ( unconveyed) $135,925.00 (Due)

Total payments required under the contract:
Down Payment
$20,000.00
3/1/69
3/J/70
311/71

25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00

Total payments made per above
excluding Promissory Note
Balance of principal due 3/J/71
Accrued interest 3/1/70 to 3/J/71
at 4% on $135,925.00
Total Due 3/I/71

$95,000.00
91,240.00
$ 3,760.00
5,437.00
$ 9,197.00
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The foregoing check was returned and Plaintiff
deposited a Cashier's Check into court in the above
amount and it has remained ever since until the appeal,
at which time the parties stipulated same, or so much
thereof as may be needed for a Supersedeas Bond in
connection with this appeal, may remain and the balance
returned to the Plaintiff.
Upon Defendants refusal to accept said check and
further upon their refusal to convey the 0.752 acres as
requested, the Plaintiff instituted its action, Case No.
198780, seeking specific performance of the terms of the
contract of sale between the parties and/ or for damages
for non-performance together with costs and attorney's
fees. Defendants at a later date instituted their action,
Case No. 198934, seeking to have title quieted to the
property in question, together with interest, costs and
attorney's fees. The two cases at the pretrial, were consolidated for trial.
There is no real issue as to the amounts of payment,
the dates of payment and the amount of acreage released. The original contract has been altered and/ or
amended innumerable times by the parties beginning
with the inception of the contract, all of which has been
done verbally with the exception of the Letter of Instructions. In other words, the parties made up their own
contract as they went along until they had a falling out.
There is now a dispute as to whether the total acreage
sold was 50.00 acres plus the 1.18 acres, or whether the
1.18 acres can be considered part of the contract, as to
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whether or 11ot the contract price amou11ts to $250,000.00
rather than $240,000.00 as shown in the contract,
whether or not the sale price is $5,000.00 per acre, rather
than $4,800.00 per acre as calculated by the contract,
"bet her or not there has been prepayments of the annual
payments, as to calculatio11 of interest, conveyances, etc.
The basic relative positions are set out in the pretrial
order. ( R. 35-41)

ARG lJ .JIEN T
POINT I
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED HY
THEIR O\VN COL'HSE OF CONDCCT TO REFCSE ACCEPTANCE OF PLAINTIFF'S
TEXDEH OF PAY.MENT.
111 the case at bar, the ink was hardly dry before the
parties started to amend the terms of the original contract and they continued to amend it throughout from
January, 1968 to 1971 and right up to the time they had
a "falling out'', all of such amendments being oral with
the exception of the Letter of Instructions. A few of
such amendments are as follows:
(a) The contract callec.l for six ( 6) acres to be
released for the $20,000.00 down payment, yet
H.567 acres were released but the Plaintiff had to
pay $32,835.00 to get same.
( b) Acreage was to be released after the first six
( 6) acres on a basis of five ( 5) acres for every
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$25,000.00 paid, yet some 14.248 acres were released for the payment of $30,900.00 on February
17, 1969, and no acreage for the payment of $22,250.00 on October 9, 1969, and no acreage for the
payment of $18,090.00 on January 7, 1970.

( c) No principal payment was made on .March I,
1970.

( d) The 1970 and part of the 1971 payments
were prepaid without complete written authority.
(e) The Defendants charged interest on the
$12,835.00 Promissory Note when the Note on its
face did not call for interest.
( f) The Defendants charged interest on $250,000.00 on the contract which was not agreed to and
the contract did not call for that amount as the contract price was $240,000.00.
(g) The Defendants released 1.18 acres of land
outside the legal description of the contract and
subsequently changed their minds as to the inclusion of same in the terms of the contract.
(h) The Defendants were given a drainage easement on the 1.18 acreage.
( i) The Plaintiff was charged and paid penalty
interest on interest.
The foregoing are but a few of the modifications
and is evidence that the parties made up their own contract or contracts as they went along.
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It is true that a simple contract completely reduced
to writing cannot be contradicted, changed, or modified
by parol evidence of what was said and done by the parties to it at the time it was made; the very purpose of the
writing is to render the agreement more certain and to
exclude parol evidence of it. Nevertheless, by the rules
of the common law, it is competent for the parties to a
simple contract in writing, before any breach of its provisions, altogether to waive, dissolve, or abandon it, or
to add to, change, or modify it, or vary or nulif y its
terms, and thus make it a new one. The reason for this is
that simple contracts, whether written or otherwise, are,
in the absence of a statute changing the rule, of the same
dignity in contemplation of law, and therefore the written contract may be changed, modified, or waived in
whole or in part by subsequent one, express, written,
oral, or implied. 1'eal v. Bilby, 123 US 572, 31 Led 263,
8 S Ct 239; Chesapeake~ 0. Canal Co. v. Ray, 101 US
522, 25 L ed 792; Hawkins v. US, 96 US 689, 24 L ed
607, 17 Am. J ur 2nd Sec. 466 Contracts.

The Utah Supreme Court in Davis v. Payne and
Day, Inc. cited in IO Utah 2d 53, 348 P2d 337 says:
Parties to written contracts may modify, waive, or make
new terms notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such freedom. See also Dillman v.
Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P2d 296.
Our court in Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction
Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P2d 985 said: The fact
that parties have a written contract on a subject does not
prevent them from entering into other agreements re-
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lating to the same general subject matter and held that
the evidence supported a finding that in addition to the
written contract pursuant to which Plaintiff was to furnish aggregate for highway construction parties had
separate agreement pursuant to which Plaintiff was to
perform and be paid for other services. Our court in
McCarren v. Merrill cited in 15 Utah :2d 179, 389 P2d
732 said that where a contract calling for installation ot'
plumbing work by plaintiff in defendant's apartment
house for a fixed sum was silent as to time of payment,
enforcement of oral agreement that payment was to be
made each month for work completed during the month
was proper. See also 17 Am Jur :2nd Sec 465 Contracts.
It is evident from the above Utah Case Law and
the facts, the record, and depositions in the instant case,
that the Plaintiff through the course of conduct of the
Defendants has been induced to change its positiou as t~
advance payments and moneys due, and that there has
been an equitable estoppel.
Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, is a term
applied usually to a situation where, because of something which he has done or omitted to do, a party is denied the right to plead or prove an otherwise important
fact. Peterson v. Ogden City, Ill Utah 125, 176 P2d
599.

The most comprehensive definition of equitable
estoppel in pais is that it is the principle by which a party
who knows or should know the truth is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying, or as-
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serting the contrary of, auy material fact which, by his
words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, he has induced another,
who was excusably ignoraut of the true facts and who
had a right to rely upon such words or cuuduct, to believe
and act upon them thereby, as a cousequence reasonably
to be anticipated, changing his position in such a way
that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary
assertion was aliowed. Public Utilities Com. v. Jones,
j4 Utah 111, l 7U P 745. See also 28 Am J ur 2d Sec 27
Estuppel and Waiver.
Equitable estoppel 1s bottomed upon the notion
that, when one person makes representations to another
which warrant the latter in acting in a given way, the
one making such representations will nut be permitted
to cha11ge his position when such change would bring
about inequitable consequences tu the other person, who
relied on representations and acted thereon in good
faith, and the representations made must be in themselves sufficient tu warrant the action taken, and their
sufficiency is a judicial question. Farmers and Merchant Bank v. Cnivcrsal C.l.T. Cr. Corp., 4 Utah 2d
155, 289 P2d 1045. Under doctrine of estoppel in pais
one may by his acts or conduct away from court prevent
himself from denying in court the effect or results of
those acts. Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2<l 441, 464 P2d
598.

"Promissory estoppel" relates primarily to those informal contracts which lack consideration but where,
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because of surrounding facts, injustice can only be
avoided by enforcing the promise. Easton v. JV ycuff, 4
Utah 2d 38(), :295 P:2d 332. Loss should fall on him who
created circumstances from which it resulted, where one
of two innocent parties must suffer a loss. Hanson v.
Beehive Security Company, 14 Utah :2d 157, 380 P2d
66.
Our Supreme Court in V-1 Oil Company v. Anclwr
Petroleum Company cited in 8 Utah 2<l 349, 384 P2d
760 said: Where defendant proposed to supply to plaintiff certain number of gallons of gas per month and a
minimum quantity subject to change by mutual contract
and plaintiff signed it and returned it with a letter stating that the plaintiff was going to be a little slow in
starting, but was sure it could use the total commitment
in the next year, and plaintiff talked by telephone explaining that it could not meet the minimum requirements and defendant replied that it was of no importance, the letter, telephone conversation and defendant's
conduct, in supplying the plaintiffs commitments, absent any further evidence, sufficed to spell out a modified contract by which the defendant agreed to go alo1;g
with the plaintiff. The Utah Court in Petty v. Gindy
Manufacturing Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P2d 30
further said: Doctrine of promissory estoppel is resorted
to only where circumstances are such that equity and
good conscience render its application imperative in
order to avoid an obvious unfairness and injustice.
Generally the doctrine of estoppel in pais is founded upon principles of morality and fair dealing and 1s
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iuleucled to subsene the ends of justice. Gas Service Co.
['. Consolidated Gas V tilit ies Corp., 145 Kan. 423, 65
p ~d 584, citing R.C.L.; Bru~,ha v. Huard of Education,
.n Okla 595, 139 P 2!J8, L.Il.A. HHuC, 233. See also 19
Am J ur Sec. 42 Estoppel.
'fhe doctrine of equitable estoppel is frequeutl¥
applied to transactions in which it would be unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he, or those by whose acts he is
bound, has acquiesced. 1llatthews v. Brown, 148 Ark.
11~, 229 S.\V. 731, citing R.C.L.; Divide Cmud ~Res
ervoir Co. t'. Tenney, 57 Colo 14, 13!) P 1110, Ann. Cas.
1917D, 34u; Re Great JV cstern Beet Sugar Co., 22
Idaho :328, 125 P 799, 43 L.R.A. ( N .S.) 671; State ex
rel Frnnks v. Corvallis State Bank, 84 .l\Iont 297, 275
P ~65, citing R.C.L.; Terry v. Haynes, GO Okla 34, 158
P 1195, citing R.C.L. A party may be estopped to insist
upon a claim, assert an objection, or take a position
which is inconsistent with an admission which he has previously made and in reliance upon which the other party
has changed his position. Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah
62, 88 P (l96, IO L.R.A. ( N.S.) 404. Estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance and retention by one
haYing knowledge or notice of the facts, of benefits from
a transaction, contract, instrument, regulation, or statute
which he might haYe rejected or contested. Moss v.
Summitt County, 60 Vtah 252, 208 P 507, 26 A.L.R.
206. See also 19 Am J ur Sec 62-64 Estoppel.

111 applying the principles as set forth in the above
cases and law to the instant case, it is readily discernible
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that an equitable estoppel must be enforced. The parties
had dealt with each other for many years last past ( R
244) , they had changed the written contract, after making it, many times from the very inception of same, the
times and amounts of the payment of the principal and
interest had not complied with the terms of the written
contract whatsoever (Ex. D-19) ; the Defendants had
indicated they did not want more principal for the year
1970 and that prepayments had been made; the releases
of ground as set forth in the written contract had not
been complied with whatsoever, Plaintiff did not have
any releases of ground in 1970 and only asked for 0.752
acres to be released with the 1971 tender to complete
cluster type development and this request complied with
the $5,000.00 release clause; Plaintiff has expended
large sums of money to develop the subdiYision with installation of water, sewer, gas, power, drainage, and
other off site improvements sufficient to develop the
balance of the ground; Plaintiff has paid $104,075.00 on
the contract and has received only 20.815 acres of land
when the contract calls for 22.815 acres inasmuch as the
contract says six ( 6) acres shall be released for the $20,000.00 down payment and an acre for each $5,000.00
thereafter, therefore, the Plaintiff would be entitled to
16.815 acres for the $84,075.00 paid after the $20,000.00
down payment. Considerable sums have been expended
for engineering, rezoning, etc., applicable to an orderly
development; and Plaintiff will be deprived of its profit
on said development which usually comes at the last
stages of any subdivision development. It is evident that
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because of the surrounding facts of this case, it would be
unconscionable to allow the Defendants to declare a default inasmuch as the Defendants course of conduct has
Jed Plaintiff to believe it ha<l prepaid the contract and
timely tendered what it had been led to believe was the
proper amount <lue. Equity and good conscience alone
as well as the very morality of fair dealing make it imperative and warrant the application of an equitable
estoppel in order to avoid an obvious unfairness and injustice to the Plaintiff. To allow otherwise would force
an extreme hardship on the Plaintiff and unjustly enrich the Defendants.

POINT II
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT BREACH OR
DEFAULT OF THE CONTRACT TO \\TARRANT A FORFEITCRE AND TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT.
Although there is some early authority in support
of the rule that a party must strictly or literally perform
the stipulations on his part before the other party is
obligated to perform, unless the promises. are independent, the modern authorities support a more liberal rule.
Thus, it is said that the law looks to the spirit of a
contract and not the letter of it, and that the question
therefore is not whether a party has literally complied
with it, but whether he Ins substantially done so. Woodru ff' t'. Ho-uyh, 91 es 59Ci, 23 L ed 332; Atowich v.
limrner, :218 Cal 7ti:3, ~5 P~d (); 1st Olympic Corp. v.
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Hawryluk, 185 Cal App 2d 832, 8 Cal Rptr 728; Harrild v. Spokane School Dist., 112 \Vash 266, 192 P 1,
19 A.L.R. 811. See also 17 A ni J ur 2d Sec 37 5 Contracts. This has long been the rule in equity. Green v.
Covillaud, 10 Cal 317; Harrild v. Spokane School Dist.,
supra. Accordingly, the courts now state that substantial, and not exact, performance accompanied by good
faith is all the law requires in the case of any contract
to entitle a party to recover on it. In the instant case the
Plaintiff tendered and asked for a release of land on
what it had been led to believe was the proper amount,
both as to payment and release of land, therefore, it has
substantially complied with the amended terms of the
contract.
Forfeitures of contracts and rights thereunder are
not favored by the law; rather such forfeitures are regarded with disfavor, and are abhorred by the courts.
It is well settled that forfeitures by implication or by
construction, not compelled by express requirements,
are regarded with disfavor, and that contracts involving
a forfeiture cannot be extended beyond the strict and
literal meaning of the words used. Since forfeitures are
not favored either in equity or in law, provisions for
forfeitures are to receive, where the intent is doubtful,
a strict construction against those for whose benefit they
are introduced. Courts are reluctant to declare and
enforce a forfeiture if by reasonable construction it
can be avoided. Petersen v. Hodges, 12lUtah 72, 239
P2d 180. See also 17 Am J ur 2nd Sec. 499-500 Contracts. Forfeitures are enforced only where there is the
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dearc:st evi<lc:uce that that was what was meant by the
~Lipulation of lhe parties, aud there must be no cast
of management or trickery to entrap a party into a
forfeiture. Before forf e1ture can occur, it must be clear
that the parties intended to provide for it in the contract
under which it is attempted to enforce it; and where
the contract is revocable at the pleasure of either party,
without condition expressed, a penalty of forfeiture
cannot be enforced against either party making the
revocation. 17 Am J ur 2nd Sec. 500, supra.
Forfeitures are odious to the law, 1llorgan v. Sore11so11, :3 C tah 2d .J.28, 286 P2d 229, and equity is loath
to enforce a forfeiture, especially when refusal to do
so gives all parties to agreement every right to which
they are entitled and thus works no hardship upon
anyone. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investrnent Co., 3 Utah 2<l 121, 279 P2d 709. Language purporting to authorize forfeitures should be strictly construed and it cannot be declared on general or merely
related defalcations. Junes v. Thorvaldson, 15 Utah 2d
308, 392 P2d .J.3.
Court will refuse to enforce forfeiture of amounts
paid under real estate contract only if circumstances
are such that if forfeiture were applied it would be
so grossly excessive in relation to any realistic view
of loss that might have been contemplated by the parties
that it would shock conscience of court of equity.
Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P2d 673, citing
Malmbcry v. Bauyh, ti2 lTtah 331, 218 P 975; Croft v.
Jensen, 86 Ptah 13, .J.O P2d 198; Young v. Hansen,
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117 Utah 591, 218 P2d 666; Perli:in,s v. Spencer, 121
Utah 468, :243 P2d 446; Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d
59, 278 P2d 294; Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300
P2d 623; Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P2d
396.
In applyiug the foregoiug rules of law to the iustaut
case, certainly if the parties have co11ti11ually altered
the contract and the Defendants led the Plaintiff to so
alter its position to rely on advance payments, releases,
etc., and the Plaintiff timely tendered the payment
and made request for release in accordance with the
mutual understanding, then there should not be any
hardship worked on the Defendants. Furthermore,
the Plaintiff should at least be given the opportunity
to have the contract reinstated as a forfeiture under
the circumstances would shock the conscience of a court
of equity. One cannot declare a forfeiture of a contract
where he himself is materially in default. H uyyins v.
Green Top Dairy Farms, Inc., 75 Idaho 436, 273 P:M
399. Here the Defendants had, on October 29, 1970,
sold the same property to Jerry Sherman Young (Def.
Dep. Ex. D-3) and upon proper tender by the Plaintiff with the money computed as understood to be due
and request for conveyance of 0. 752 acres the Defendant was unable to perform. A forfeiture will be
enforced only where the party seeking the forfeiture
has strictly performed his contractual obligations according to the letter. Covington v. Ba~ich Bros. Constr.,
72 Ariz. 280, 233 P2d 837. If it plainly appears that
vendor has so lost or incumbered his ownership or his
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contract he carn10t insist th:J.t purchaser continue to
111 ake payments when it is obYious that his own performance will not be forthcommg and it is alleged that Defendants were unable to perform at the time the tender
was timely made. 1rl arlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 26 U tab 2d 124, 485 P2d 1402.

POINT Ill
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DA.MAGES
IF THE CONTRACT IS FORFEITED OR
TERl\IIN ATED.
The Yiew has beeu taken that a party who puts it
out of his power to perform a contract before the time
fixed for performance commits a breach rendering him
liable to pay damages. Lovell v. St. Louis Jlut. L. Ins.
Co., 111 US 264, 28 L ed 423, 4 S Ct. 390; Re N elf
(C.A. 6) 157 F 57. See also Restatement of Contracts
Sec. 318. In the case at bar the Defendants had sold
the same property to Jerry Sherman Young and therefore were unable to conyey any property to the Plaintiff upon request, and did not convey the 0.752 acres
when requested because of the inability to do so.
The weight of authority appears to be that the
party prevented from performing is at liberty to treat
the contract as broken and abandon it and recover damagse for the breach. Anvil 1llin. Co. v. Humble, 153
es 540, 38 L ed 814, 14 S. Ct. 876. In other words,
such party may regard it as terminated and demand
whateyer damages he has sustained thereby. U.S. v.
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Behan, llO US 338, 28 L ed 168, 4 S. Ct. 81; U.S. v.
Peck, 102 US o.J., 2o L ed .J.u. Stated a little differently
it might be said that it is the rule that where one party
is unable to perform his part of the contract, he caunot
be entitled to the performance of the contract by the
other party. 1'aylur V. 1llason, 9 vVheat (us) 325, 6
L ed 101; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall (US) 304,
1 L ed 391; Edge1ton v. Taylor, 184 NC 571, 115 SE
156. <{See also 17 Am J ur 2d Sec. 355 Contracts.
'Vhere one party to a contract has incapacitated
himself to perform his part thereof, there is no need of
the other coming forward to make tender of performance. Austin v. Vanderbilt, 48 Or 206, 85 P 519. Here
the Plaintiff went further and timely tendered the
amount required by the verbally amended contract,
requested conveyance, but Defendants didn't convey
because they had sold the property elsewhere.
If failure of one party to perform his duties under
contract results in damage to the other party, latter is
entitled to recover for breach of contractual duties.
State Automobile & Cas. Under. v. Salisbury, 27 Utah
2d 229, 494 P2d 529. The non-breaching party should
receive award which will put him in as good a position
as he would have been in had there been no breach of
contract. Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 2.3
Utah 2d 1, 455 P2d 197, and damages are not to be
denied simply because they cannot be ascertained with
exactness. If reasonable basis of calculation of damages
is afforded, it is sufficient although the result is only
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approximate. Security Development Company v.
Feclco., J nc., iB L' tah id 30ti, 462 P2d 706.
The Utah Supreme Court in Sprague v. Boyies
Bro~. Drilling Cu., 4 Ctah 2d 344, i94 P2d 689, said:

Where one party to contract, has failed or refused to
perform some obligation under it, contract may still
remain in force and, even though it does, wronged party
may be excused from further performance and recover
for loss occasioned tu him. Here the contract called
for conveyances upon payment and by the very terms
of the contract written or verbally amended the Defendants specified there were no encumbrances on
the property except a mortgage and then while the
contract was in full force and effect and even prior to
the due date, of what now turns out to be a disputed
amount, the Defendants sold the exact same property
to someone else and put themselves under such a disability that they could not and did not convey the
property requested. Therefore, the Defendants should
be liable in damages as stated in the Compalint (R
1-4) if the contract is forfeited or tenninated, as the
Defendants can't have their cake and eat it both. As~uming for sake of argument, that Defendants could
have cancelled the Young contract there has been a
frustration of purpose of object of the contract by
the Defendants' actions. In a case where performance
had not become impossible, but achievement of the
object or purpose of the contract was frustrated the
defensive doctrine applied has been variously designated as that of "frustration" of the purpose or object
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of the contract or "commercial frustration." Lloyd v.
llf urphy, 25 Cal 2d 48, 153 P2d 47, which would even
be grounds for non-performance on the part of Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiff having expended considerable
swns made a timely and proper tender and was refused
performance by the Defendants.

CONCLUSION
It is readily discernible from the pleadings, depositions, exhibits, and in fact the entire record, that because of the parties' past association and the method
of handling the transactions, that the written contract,
subsequent to execution, was orally amended almost
every time any payment was due or made, or any property released. In fact from its very inception, as the
down payment was orally changed from $20,000~to
$32,835.00, there were 6.567 acres released at the time
the contract was executed rather than 6.00 acres, and
the Plaintiff, instead of getting 6.00 acres for $20,000.00
had to pay $32,835.00 and the payments were prepaid
both by written and oral agreement. It would be safe
to say that innumerable new contracts or amendmnts
to the old contract were orally made through the period
from the date of contract until the time suit was filed.

It is further readily discernible that the Plaintiff,
through the course of conduct of the Defendants, has
been induced to change its position as to amounts due
and as to advance payments and in reliance thereof
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there has been an equitable esloppel and the terms of
the contract muddied accordingly. That it would be
unmoral and unconscionable to permit the Defendants
to declare a furf eiture or termination of the contraict
iri question awl be unjustly enriched to the extent of
<lepriving the Plamtiff of its profiit from the rest of
the subdivision, to receive the benefits of the offsite
improvements installed an<l the better rewning obtained
for the beneti t of the rest of the property under contract, to reap some :j;700.00 per acre profit on the contract entered into with Jerry Sherman Young on the
remaining approximate :JO acres that are unconveyed
when the Plaintiff's and Defendants contract was not
in default. Equity and good conscience alone as well
as the very morality of fair dealing make it imperative
and warrant the application of an equitable estoppel
in order to avoid an obYious unfairness and injustice
to the Plaintiff. To allow otherwise would, as indicated
above, force an extreme hardship on the Plaintiff and
unjustly enrich the Defendants.
llased upon the facts, circumstances, and the
record in this case, the judgment of the lower court
should be vacated, the contract reinstated and declared
in full force and effect with the Plaintiff afforded a
reasonable time to bring the contract current for the
payment due since the lawsuits were filed, and the Defendants ordered to convey the property due for the
payment or payments made or to be made, together
with an award for costs and attorney's fees. In the alternath·e, if the Defendants have so jeopardized them-
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selves as to the inability to convey the property then
the case should be remanded for the assessment of damages, costs and attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted,
VICTOR G. SAGERS
7321 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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